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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The warp and woof of the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act
1
 (IDEA) is participation, discussion and compromise, 
and, hopefully, agreement.  From the outset, the entire educational 
process—notification, independent education program (IEP) 
meeting(s), mediation, and facilitation—provides numerous 
opportunities for parents and schools to find common ground.  If and 
when these processes do not succeed and a “final” decision is necessary 
or desired, the due process procedures encourage agreement during 
mediation and resolution sessions. 
Given this environment, urging the addition of arbitration to 
the dispute resolution procedures might appear to be oxymoronic.  
Arbitration is almost the antithesis of participation, discussion and 
compromise, but the availability of arbitration as suggested below 
would add two improvements to the IDEA dispute resolution system 
that experience shows are sorely needed: a more balanced “access to 
justice” and swift and final decisions (at least for a while
2
).  Both of 
these improvements would be of material benefit to the person who is 
supposed to be the focus of the process: the child.  
                                                          
* Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, 
Seattle University School of Law.  Professor Rosenfeld joined the Law School in 
September 2001; he supervised the Special Education Clinical program and 
established the National Academy of IDEA Administrative Law Judges and 
Hearing Officers, which has trained special education hearing officers from over 
25 states. In June 2009, he became Director of Education Law Programs.  He 
currently serves as Chair of the Special Education Section of the National 
Association of Administrative Law Judiciary (NAALJ).  Prior to joining the Law 
School, he founded and, for five years, served as Executive Director of COPAA 
(The Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates), a private, non-profit 
organization established to improve the quality and increase the quantity of legal 
resources for parents of children with disabilities.  In April 2002, he was invited to 
testify before the President’s Commission on Excellence in Special Education, 
which accepted his proposal to establish a system of arbitration for special 
education. 
 
1 20 U.S.C. 1401, et seq. (2012). 
2 Given a child’s changing needs, not to mention the statutory mandate to 
reconsider them annually, no decision concerning special education programming 
can be final once and for all.  This point is discussed further below. 
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When first proposed a decade ago, the addition of an 
arbitration option to IDEA received, what can only be charitably 
called, a “mixed” reception.
3
  Since that time, the inequity of due 
process hearings has grown;
4
 and, particularly, as I have had the 
privilege of listening to how hearing officers from across the nation 
approach due process hearings,
5
 I am persuaded that adding 
                                                          
3 The suggestion was included almost as an afterthought to prepared 
testimony before the President’s Commission on Excellence in Special Education: 
 
There should and must be a wide variety of dispute resolution 
procedures available for both parents and school districts to 
use . . . One additional dispute resolution procedure might be 
voluntary but binding arbitration available only upon the 
election of both of the parties.  I suspect many parents and 
schools would be willing to waive their rights of appeal from 
such decisions if they were fair, impartial and fast. 
 
U.S. Department of Education Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative 
Services, President’s Special Commission on Excellence in Special Education, 
Dept. of Educ., A New Era: Revitalizing Special Education for Children and Their 
Families 41 (2002) (quoting Transcript of Commission Meeting Held in San Diego, 
CA at 141), available at 
http://education.ucf.edu/mirc/Research/President's%20Commission%20on%20Exc
ellence%20in%20Special%20Education.pdf.  
The Commission agreed, and recommended that IDEA permit creation of 
voluntary binding arbitration systems.  See id.  So, apparently, did the U.S. House 
of Representatives, which included it in the bill it reported.  But the U.S. Senate did 
not and the provision was omitted in the final compromise bill.  My understanding 
is that opposition came primarily from the parent community, which was not 
surprising given the absence of explanation of how arbitration might work. 
4 Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health & 
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (recovery of attorneys’ fees); Schaffer v. Weast, 
546 U.S. 49 (2005) (burden of proof in due process hearings); Arlington Cent. Sch. 
Dist. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006) (recovery of experts’ fees). 
5 This has occurred over the last ten years at the National Academy of 
IDEA Administrative Law Judges and Impartial Hearing Officers, located at the 
Seattle University School of Law, which drew hundreds of special education 
hearing officers from approximately half of the states.  See IDEA ALJ/HO 
Academy, SEATTLE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, 
http://www.law.seattleu.edu/Continuing_Legal_Education/IDEA_ALJHO_Academ
y.xml (last visited Nov. 17, 2012).  Also, it has occurred during the last four years 
at seven trainings for the California Office of Administrative Hearings, which are 
organized and conducted by the National Academy for California’s special 
education hearing officers (ALJs) and mediators.  Id.  Discussions in both of these 
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arbitration as a dispute resolution option will better coincide with the 
needs of a significant number of participants in the IDEA process.  
Therefore, what follows is not intended to be a classic law 
review article, or even a thorough and complete proposal.  Rather, 
my objective is to briefly note existing problems of the dispute 
resolution procedures, outline the major components of an arbitration 
system, make some suggestions on how to implement some of those 
components and call for further suggestions where more thought is 
required.  It is, in other words, a snapshot of the current status of the 
proposal,
6
 reflecting development at the time of the Pepperdine 
symposium presentation,
7
 as well as recent discussions with parents, 
education agency personnel, attorneys who represent both, and local 
state and Federal level administrators and regulators.
8 
 
                                                          
forums can be quite candid, as they are open only to currently sitting hearing 
officers.  Id. 
6 About ten years ago, per the request of the Office of Special Education 
Programs of developing an arbitration proposal, I informally conducted a 
discussion group of persons with extensive experience in various aspects of special 
education dispute resolution.  While the discussion group agreed that any new 
process must be voluntary, informal, and expedited, the group disagreed about 
many other aspects.  Indeed, most of the participants believed that an additional 
dispute resolution process was neither necessary nor desirable.  They preferred, 
instead, that changes be made in the existing dispute resolution methods, such as 
due process and mediation.  And while there was widespread agreement that due 
process had become too cumbersome, expensive, and time consuming, there was 
very little agreement on how these problems might be remedied. 
I suggest that most of these misgivings arise from two fundamental 
concerns: (1) an unwillingness to forego the protections afforded by current law, 
even though they may not be available to many of those affected, and (2) the 
difficulty in evaluating the process outside of traditional legal practices.  The first 
concern is important in assuring and specifying the quality of a new dispute 
resolution system since it would be unreasonable to expect parents to consent to a 
process that can promise no better results for their child and would be arbitrary to 
boot.  For this reason, it must be beyond question that parental consent to 
arbitration is both fully informed and voluntary, and that the decision makers are 
truly independent and knowledgeable.  These are discussed further below, see infra 
Part III. 
7 Special Education Law Symposium: Examining the IDEA in Theory and 
Practice at Pepperdine University School of Law (Feb. 10, 2012).  
8 A similar presentation, The Case for Voluntary Binding Arbitration: It’s 
Not What You Think, was made by the author at CADRE’s 5th National 
Symposium on Dispute Resolution in Special Education in Eugene, OR (Oct. 26, 
2011).  Further, I have had numerous information discussions with attorneys 
 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 32-2 
 
548 
II.  PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT MECHANISMS 
 
Current dispute resolution mechanisms satisfy few, if any, 
problems of the parties involved.
9
  While mediation may appear to be 
more favorable than due process hearings since most disputes are now 
resolved through mediation, accurately gauging public preference is far 
more complicated.  Further, few would quarrel with the proposition that 
anyone has a good view of due process hearings—including many of 
the people who conduct them.
10 
 
But it is probably true that mediation at least offers a better 
chance of addressing and ameliorating the emotional divide that has 
arisen between parents and school personnel.
11
  Even so, the 
variations in how mediations are conducted, who conducts them, why 
and how the parties engage in the process, pre-existing expectations, 
and (most importantly) outcomes clearly indicate that results leave 
much to be desired.
12
  Therefore, it is difficult to avoid the 
                                                          
representing education agencies and schools, education agency personnel and 
teachers, and parents and parent groups. 
9 It is important to distinguish between the procedures set forth in IDEA 
to encourage parent participation in objective identification, testing and assessment 
of children with disabilities, from the dispute resolution mechanisms themselves, 
primarily mediation (of various types) and due process hearings. 
10 My experience, after listening to private informal discussions of the 
hearing process for over ten years by hundreds of hearing officers (both 
administrative law judges and contract hearing officers) from across the nation, 
indicates that while the large majority of special education hearing officers are 
dedicated to doing the best job they can, many officers are as frustrated by the 
inequity of the proceedings since the parents appear pro se and have the limitations 
imposed by the process, and what most perceive as the narrow focus of their role.  
A persistent concern has been the lack of specific authority or guidance at the 
federal level, leaving pro se parents with no alternative but to rely on state law, 
which is too often inapposite, at best. 
11 Even mediation is intended primarily to facilitate settlement, not to 
determine who is “right.”  Steve S. Goldberg, Special Education Mediation: 
Responding to a Proposal for Reform, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 127 (2001).  This may be 
important for future relations of the parent(s) and the school personnel, but it is a 
clear indication that the child’s interests are somewhat secondary. 
12 In reviewing requests for pro bono representation by our law school 
clinic over a period of four years, I was amazed at how many applicants submitted 
mediation settlement agreements that were so imprecise as to be rendered 
unenforceable.  Many parents frankly admitted that they did not know when they 
signed the agreement, or that they believed the school district would make a broad 
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conclusion, that mediation is often perceived as a “poor man’s” 
alternative to a due process hearing, a settlement for the best that can 
be obtained in the absence of legal representation. 
This is not to say that due process hearings are more 
satisfying.  Perhaps the most revealing concise characterization of 
how due process hearings are perceived is the title of chapter 10 of 
the Fordham Foundation Report: Nasty, Brutish . . . and Often Not 
Very Short—identified as The Attorney Perspective on Due 
Process.
13
 [Emphasis supplied.]  If that title can be said to accurately 
represent the view of those who have only professional involvement 
in the process (and those who may reap substantial financial benefit 
from it), it does not take much imagination to opine what the 
participants think.  Most education agency personnel such as 
teachers, related service providers, and administrative personnel are 
trained to collaborate, and view the adversarial atmosphere of a due 
process hearing as a nightmare.  Supervisory personnel are somewhat 
more objective because of their greater experience.  However, 
supervisory personnel still find the demands of a due process hearing 
as an expensive and negative “drag” on their primary goal of 
administering an educational program.  Therefore, both groups view 
the procedural (legal) focus of the process as mostly irrelevant to 
what they are supposed to be doing. 
Further, the overwhelming majority of parents see themselves 
as “David against Goliath”—whether assayed from emotional, 
knowledge or resource viewpoints.
14
  There has been a long-standing 
consensus that very few, if any, disputes (even a divorce) involve 
greater emotional tension than a parents’ desires and attempts to 
secure adequate educational programs and services for their child.  
Similarly, even though most reasonably sophisticated parents may 
have a well-grounded and practical knowledge of what it takes to 
navigate the current special education system, only the “one percent” 
                                                          
good faith effort to reach objectives discussed in the course of the mediation, but 
not explicitly stated in the agreement. 
13 Lanigan, Audette, Dreier and Kobersy, Rethinking Special Education 
for a New Century 213 (2001). 
14 Most of this is due to the problem that the large majority of parents are 
either unable to locate or afford counsel.  While this problem is not unique to 
special education, the fact that the dispute concerns children with disabilities seems 
even more unjust. 
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can be confident that they have the financial resources to both obtain 
and retain the necessary expertise. 
The playing field was tilted even further during the last 
decade by three United States Supreme Court decisions concerning 
the criteria for the recovery of attorneys’ fees, the allocation of the 
burden of proof in due process hearings, and the recovery of fees for 
experts.  First, Buckhannon Board & Care Home Inc. v. West 
Virginia Department of Health & Human Services,
15
 a case involving 
the Fair Housing Amendments Act and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), held that parties are entitled to the recovery 
of attorneys’ fees when they prevail on the merits of their claims by 
receiving “at least some relief,” which can be even nominal 
damages.
16
  That ruling has uniformly been held to apply to IDEA’s 
fee provisions.  Schaffer v. Weast
17
 held that the party who files the 
request for due process has the burden of persuasion at the hearing; in 
practice, that is almost always the parents.
18
  Arlington Central 
School District Board of Education v. Murphy
19
 held that section 
1415(i)(3)(B) of IDEA does not authorize prevailing parents to 
recover expert fees even though the parents prevailed on the merits of 
the claim because of the importance of expert testimony in an 
overwhelming majority of IDEA cases.
20
  Therefore, even if the 
parents are successful, complaining parents must find a way to secure 
expert witnesses without the expectation of being reimbursed for 
expert fees even if they are successful.  In combination, these three 
rulings have proved that there is almost an insurmountable barrier to 
successful pursuit of due process and the civil litigation that follows. 
In addition, there are problems regarding the time required to 
exhaust the legal process.  For many, if not most, a final decision will 
come well past the time it can be of any benefit to the most important 
party: the student.  A frequent consequence is that, over time, the 
dispute tends to become more focused on the needs, desires, and 
frustrations of the parties, as opposed to the educational needs of the 
                                                          
15 532 U.S. 598 (2001). 
16 See id. at 603–04.  
17 546 U.S. 49 (2005). 
18 See id. at 62. 
19 548 U.S. 291 (2006). 
20 See id. at 293–94; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2006).  
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child.
21
  And the hearing process, itself, has some serious defects.  
Many hearing officers are faced with the obligation to decide 
between proposals that they are not well trained to evaluate.  
Moreover, because of fears of being perceived as partial, many 
believe themselves handcuffed in asking for or requiring additional 
information from either of the parties that they suspect may be 
important, if not crucial, in deciding the case before them.
22
 
 
III.  SYSTEMIC OBJECTIVES OF ARBITRATION 
 
As proposed below, the option of arbitration would correct 
many of these problems.  Perhaps most important, by eliminating the 
need for attorneys it would create the basic equity of process that 
Congress presumably intended.  This should also reduce the adversarial 
atmosphere of the proceeding.
23
  Equally important, there would be a 
much shorter timeline for decision and implementation; and, in most 
disputes, the focus would clearly be on the student’s educational 
program, thereby enhancing the student benefit that underlies the 
purpose of the statute.  The expertise of the decision-making body 
would be increased by vesting responsibility in a panel consisting of a 
disability expert, an educator, and a lawyer.  And, finally, by virtue of a 
combination of all these factors—shorter decision timeline, greater 
expertise, better focused objective and less “legal maneuvering”—the 
overall costs of dispute resolution should be reduced. 
                                                          
21 Not surprisingly, parents tend to take school disagreements personally.  
According to the parents, school personnel (and their counsel) often cite the 
“problem” of setting a precedent as a reason for not agreeing to provide what 
otherwise appears to be an appropriate program for the specific child in front of 
them, apparently overlooking or ignoring the individualized focus of IDEA. 
22 Perhaps the best illustration of this is the fact that section 300.502(d), 
authorizing hearing officers to request (on their own motion) an independent 
educational evaluation (IEE) as part of the hearing, is essentially a dead letter.  Of 
the hundreds of hearing officers who have attended the Academy in Seattle over 
ten years, only two officers requested an IEE on this authority.  A frequent 
explanation for failure to do so is the concern about an officer not appearing 
impartial.  This reluctance to “develop the record” is also particularly surprising 
given the general perception that a special education due process hearing is usually 
considered to be a “somewhat less than formal” administrative proceeding.  
23 Or, if not eliminate due process hearings, at least transfer it to the 
arbitrators, which might be a considerable benefit. 
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The following section provides a more detailed identification 
and discussion of the various factors that would be incorporated into 
the arbitration model and how those incorporated factors would 
function.  To be clear, where substantial questions remain, some of 
the possible alternatives are identified.  None of this is meant to be 
exhaustive; to the contrary, it is set forth in the hope and expectation 
that others can and will identify oversights and make additional 
suggestions. 
 
A.  Consent to Arbitration Must be Explicit, Voluntary, and 
Fully Informed 
 
Consent to arbitration must be fully informed and completely 
voluntary.  This is fundamental for both equitable and practical 
reasons, and cannot be too strongly emphasized.  Given the nature of 
special education disputes, there is little likelihood that such a 
proposal would be utilized if either of the parties, but especially the 
parents, did not have complete confidence that they understood what 
they were gaining and giving up.  Equally important for many, or 
even most, parents, a full understanding of the arbitration process is 
likely to enhance its attractiveness.
24
  It is also a crucial factor in 
establishing the finality of the arbitration proceeding.
25
 
Thus, the more difficult question is how to assure that the 
consent is fully informed and voluntary.  A common method of 
providing that assurance under our legal system has been to rely on 
the support and advice of counsel.  But, as noted above, one of the 
chief objectives of the proposal is to remediate the inability of the 
parents to secure or retain counsel.  It should be clear that, given the 
importance of assuring that any consent is truly informed and 
voluntary, simply making written materials available and explaining 
the “pluses and minuses” of consenting to arbitration does not satisfy 
the required standard.
26
  Nor do written materials allow the 
                                                          
24 This is not just a supposition.  In explaining to many parents what I had 
in mind beyond the basic concept of arbitration, the large majority became more 
receptive to the concept the more they heard about it. 
25 See infra Part III.B. 
26 This is apparent to anyone who has tried to draft a “plain English” 
document about anything but the simplest legal procedure, which is not how IDEA 
procedures have been traditionally described.  More to the point, one can point to 
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opportunity for questions and explanations that should underlay truly 
informed consent. 
For the foregoing reasons, it seems necessary to provide some 
limited access to an independent person whose obligation, broadly 
speaking, would be to explain the IDEA procedural options and the 
consequences of submitting to a voluntary binding process.  To 
minimize the cost and burden, a general written explanation should 
be prepared
27
 that would include the major points to be conveyed and 
common questions, as well as initial responses and explanations.  The 
independent person would be responsible for walking the parent(s) 
through the written explanation, responding to questions and 
explaining variations in state practice and procedure in state 
terminology.  Although I have no data to support an estimate of how 
long this might take, my “educated” guess would be an average of no 
more than three hours. 
This function could be performed by a number of 
possibilities, none of which is clearly superior or exclusive.  Perhaps 
the most obvious would be specially trained employees of state 
protection and advocacy agencies and other state and local advocacy 
organizations.  Another possibility would be law school clinical 
programs.  And, I would not exclude attorneys in private practice, 
provided that their activities were carefully limited and reasonably 
compensated.
28
  But, it should be clear that any attorney who 
performs this task with Parent A is thereafter unable to represent 
Parent A in any capacity in a proceeding arising from that 
consultation. 
                                                          
the written copies of IDEA’s procedural safeguards liberally distributed by most 
school districts and ignored as incomprehensible by most parents.  
27 It remains to be determined who would prepare the basic written 
document and make the determination that the document satisfies its intended 
purpose.  This is discussed further, infra Part IV, at “Related Issues to Be 
Addressed.”  However, historical experience recommends that this decision not be 
made by existing federal or state level regulatory agencies, neither of which tends 
to be artful in providing simple, readable explanations. 
28 The limitations would be carefully spelled out in the package that 
contained the general written explanations.  Funding might be supervised and 
provided by state bar associations as a method of satisfying common pro bono 
obligations.  Thus, for example, an attorney, whether in public or private practice 
would request to be added to a roster of available persons and agree to a maximum 
compensation of three hours at a rate established by the state bar equal to a pre-
determined average hourly rate for the state. 
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In addition to the customary information concerning IDEA 
rights and procedures, however, there should be explicit statements 
concerning the conduct, scope, and authority of the arbitration panel.  
These should include notification and explanation of the following: 
a) that no attorneys, whether as counsel or participant, can 
be present in the arbitration proceeding unless the parent 
explicitly consents or is represented by counsel;  
b) that rules for conduct of the proceeding shall be set at the 
complete discretion of the arbitration panel;  
c) that the arbitration panel has complete discretion to 
determine the nature and scope of the evidence (witnesses 
and documents) it will seek or hear; 
d) that the record of the proceeding will be confidential and 
that substantive challenges to the decision can be heard 
only by the arbitration panel, itself;  
e) that both parties consent to implement and abide by the 
decision of the arbitration panel, within any specified 
timelines within five working days from issuance of the 
arbitration decision, or post a bond in the amount set by 
the panel. 
 
B.  The Arbitration Decision Must Be Final and Binding 
 
At first blush, this requirement might appear to be obvious, as 
many arbitration proceedings are undertaken as final and binding.
29
  
                                                          
29  
The very purpose of contractual arbitration is to avoid the 
courts.  Therefore, the courts have long held that there is no 
right of appeal from an arbitrator's award; any decision is final 
and binding.  The only exceptions are where the arbitrator 
clearly exceeds his authority or had a conflict of interest. 
 
Adam Morris, Supremes Open Small Window to Arbitration Appeal, AARON 
MORRIS’ BUSINESS LAW ALERT (Sept. 7, 2008) 
http://www.businesslawalert.com/2008/09/articles/employment/the-supremes-
open-small-window-to-arbitration-appeals/.  The article discusses a then-recent 
decision by the California Supreme Court recognizing the right to appeal an 
arbitration award where the arbitration agreement provided that "the arbitrators 
shall not have the power to commit errors of law or legal reasoning, and the award 
may be vacated or corrected on appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction for any 
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But there are serious and legitimate public policy and juridical 
concerns about placing insuperable bars to appeals of arbitration 
proceedings.
30
  By contrast, the importance of the finality of a special 
education arbitration proceeding is difficult to understate.  Parents 
who agree to arbitration will most likely view it as a way around their 
inability to locate or afford counsel,
31
 as is intended.  However, there 
would be no reason to do so, if following the arbitration proceeding, 
the education agency could easily appeal the outcome to a traditional 
civil litigation forum.  For this reason alone, consideration must be 
given to making appeal of the arbitration proceeding as difficult as 
possible.
32
 
However, there is also another reason, only somewhat less 
important.  If an arbitration proceeding can be appealed, even with 
some difficulty, the likelihood is that those losing education agencies 
will appeal.  In this scenario, therefore, the arbitration proceeding 
becomes just another costly litigation hurdle to be endured.  
Consequently, that possibility substantially undercuts the contention 
that the availability of arbitration can reduce the costs of dispute 
resolution on a systemic basis.  To state the obvious: less litigation, 
less cost. 
                                                          
such error."  Id. (quoting Cable Connections, Inc. v. DirecTV, Inc. 44 Cal. 4th 
1334, 1340 (2008)). 
30 
There exists a clear tension concerning the finality of arbitral 
awards.  On the one hand, one of the principal benefits of 
arbitration is, or at least used to be, that generally the award is 
final and binding upon the parties.  Arbitration can thus be a 
relatively quick and efficient way to resolve a dispute.  On the 
other hand, as arbitrators are asked to interpret more complex 
legal issues, that same finality is increasingly felt as the 
absence of much needed quality control over arbitrators. 
 
Eric Van Ginkel, Reframing the Dilemma of Contractually Expanded Judicial 
Review: Arbitral Appeal vs. Vacatur, 3 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 157, 160 (2003).  
Consideration of these questions is beyond the scope of this article.      
31 Obviously, there may be other reasons: the near certainty of a quick 
decision and, perhaps more important, the expectation that an arbitration 
proceeding will focus on their child’s educational needs, as opposed to procedural 
considerations. 
32 This might not be as easy as it sounds, as courts have jealously guarded 
their authority as protectors of due process.  But it re-emphasizes the importance of 
voluntary, fully informed disclosure and the document described in Part III.A. 
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None of this reduces the difficulty of precluding judicial 
review of an arbitration order.
33
  One possibility strongly resisted by 
both attorneys and existing decision-makers is limiting the 
circumstances of creation, the scope, and the retention period of the 
arbitration record.
34
  Another option might be requiring the appealing 
party to post a substantial bond, recoverable only if the appeal is 
successful.
35
  This option appears to be less drastic, but also less 
equitable.  After all, if a party can afford to challenge the decision, 
e.g., retaining counsel to do so, presumably posting the bond 
becomes just another cost.
36
 
 
C.  The Arbitration Decision Should Be Issued Within Thirty School 
Days From Assignment of the Arbitration Request to an 
Arbitration Panel 
 
The general objective should be to begin and complete the 
arbitration proceeding as quickly as possible.  IDEA regulations 
require a due process hearing decision within forty-five days,
37
 but 
only after expiration or waiver of the resolution process, which can 
take thirty days.  Moreover, the forty-five day timeline can be 
extended by the hearing officer “at the request of either party,”
38
 a 
not infrequent occurrence.
39
  Even so, there is a wide spectrum of 
                                                          
33 There are also questions about whether and, if so, when it should be 
possible to withdraw from an arbitration proceeding once it has begun.  These 
remain to be addressed. 
34 For example, while it may be desirable, even necessary, to have a 
transcript or video or audio recording for the limited purpose of enabling the 
arbitrators to prepare a decision, one possibility might be destroying any record 
once the decision is reached, but before it is issued to the parties. 
35 This could be prescribed in the arbitration order, where the amount of 
the bond could be set on a case-by-case basis and adjusted to reflect the financial 
capabilities of the respective parties. 
36 One way of addressing this potential inequity would be to require the 
arbitration panel, itself, to set the amount of the appeal bond for each party, with 
recognition that a higher bond can be required of education agencies. 
37 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(b) (2012) (timelines and convenience of hearings 
and reviews). 
38 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(c) (2012). 
39 Adherence to the forty-five day timeline is one of the few hearing 
objectives monitored by the Office of Special Education Programs, probably 
because it provides one of the few “objective” criteria of the hearing process. 
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opinion about how faithfully the timeline is followed and, depending 
upon one’s position in a specific proceeding, whether strict adherence 
to the timeline is beneficial or not.
40
 
There should be circumstances under which the decision 
timeline can be more than thirty days, but these should be extremely 
limited and generally agreed to at the outset of the arbitration.  To 
enable this result, the arbitrators would be vested with broad 
authority in the conduct of the proceeding, as discussed below.
41
  
This should follow from recognition of the fact that most delays in 
dispute resolution proceedings result from inconvenience.
42
  The 
arbitrators should be empowered to require expedition of any 
subsidiary process needed to complete the proceeding.
43
 
 
D.  The Arbitration Decision Should Be Specific and Directly 
Enforceable by the State Education Agency  
 
One of the widespread, recurring problems with mediation 
agreements and due process hearing decisions is figuring out what to 
do with them after they are issued.  Even putting aside the wide 
variation in their form and content, the mediation agreements and 
hearing decisions tend not to be very specific within their four 
corners; for example, they often do not spell out precisely what must 
be done.  Additionally, there tends to be substantial disagreement 
about whether they are being properly implemented, and enforceable.  
If a procedure is intended to resolve disputes, it should do so.  
The arbitration decision should be a quasi-IEP,
44
 for example, the 
                                                          
40 If dissatisfaction with a rule can be a measure of its effectiveness, the 
forty-five day timeline is probably a success.  The attitude of a party (parent or 
school attorney) varies depending upon the particular hearing, but special education 
hearing officers almost uniformly object to the lack of flexibility imposed by the 
timeline.  Their reasons vary widely, ranging from caseload overload to obstruction 
from the parties to case complexity.   
41 See infra Part III.G. 
42 On the attorneys’ side, this could be heavy calendars over which they 
sometimes have little control; on the educators’ side, this could be custom and 
contractual agreements concerning working hours and vacations.  There appears to 
be wide variation among states in dealing with this kind of problem. 
43 As I have heard at least one hearing officer to have observed: “That’s 
what a subpoena is for!”  
44 A good IEP, obviously. 
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decision should clearly identify the short-term goals, spell out any 
necessary programs, services to be provided, by whom, their 
duration, who is responsible for assuring the provision of the 
programs and services, and how and when they are to be monitored.  
If possible, the description of the program and service provider 
should identify the specific education agency personnel (if they are 
the providers) or the specific outside program or service providers, at 
least by organization. 
The arbitration procedures should also provide that 
complaints about the enforceability of the decision should be filed 
with the state education agency (SEA) and that the SEA be required 
to assure compliance within fifteen calendar days
45
 from the filing of 
the complaint.  Any such complaints should be limited to whether the 
arbitration order has been, or is being, implemented and, if not, why.  
The SEA should not be able to review any other substantive or 
procedural aspect of the arbitration decision or order, e.g., that the 
arbitration decision or order was inappropriate. 
 
E. The Record of the Arbitration Proceeding Should Be Minimal and 
Confidential as a Matter of Law 
 
The concept of minimizing the formal record of a decision-
making proceeding is likely to be extremely controversial, even as its 
underlying purpose—minimizing appeals—may be viewed 
favorably.  However, the historical record concerning other types of 
arbitration reveals a fertile ground for subsequent challenges 
concerning procedural (due process) matters.  In truth, it is 
impossible to insulate any arbitration proceeding from all such 
challenges, however worthy the goal.  On the other hand, an 
extensive formal record will just provide a larger, probably easier, 
target.  Accordingly, it seems only logical to specify that the formal 
record be minimal and confidential as a matter of law.  Precisely 
what this might be is one of those matters that require further 
consideration.  
 
                                                          
45 The short period (e.g., 15 calendar days vs. 15 school days) seems 
justified given the fact that the education agency was well aware of its obligation. 
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F. Counsel Should Be Present During the Arbitration Proceeding 
Only at the Option of the Parties 
 
Inasmuch as one of the primary objectives of this procedure is 
to redress the inherent inequity of unrepresented parents, those 
parents should be able to veto the presence of an attorney for the 
education agency.  This includes both an attorney, as representative, 
and any education agency personnel who happen to be attorneys.  
Thus, no attorneys would be present, in any capacity, unless the 
parents either (1) are themselves represented by counsel or (2) do not 
object to the participation of education agency counsel.  This 
decision would be made at the time the parents provide their 
informed consent to participate in the process and would be verified 
by the arbitrators. 
To be clear, during the arbitration proceeding, the parents 
would continue to have the option of being accompanied by a support 
person of their choice, whether or not they veto the presence of 
education agency counsel.  The purpose is to enable any emotional 
support that may be helpful in the conduct of the proceeding.  
However, this person could not be an attorney or a non-attorney (lay) 
advocate. 
 
G. The Arbitrators Should Have Complete Discretion to Prescribe 
the Formality of and Procedures for the Proceeding 
 
The arbitration proceeding has the best chance of achieving 
its procedural and substantive objectives if the arbitrators are 
provided maximum flexibility in ordering and conducting the 
proceedings.
46
  However, there can be considerable differences 
concerning exactly what this means.  One approach could be 
specification of changes within existing formal procedural rules, such 
as relaxation of rules of evidence.  Another would be to vest the 
arbitrators with more extensive authority, such as ordering extensive 
pre-hearing consultations and the ability to limit the time for 
presentation and volume of evidence. 
To achieve both the broad goals and specific objectives 
contemplated by this procedure within the strict timeline given, and 
                                                          
46 This approach was agreed to even by those who did not favor arbitration 
in my original consultations ten years ago, see supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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to minimize appeals of the arbitration decision based on denial of due 
process, the arbitrators should be provided explicit maximum 
flexibility to prescribe and control all aspects of the proceeding.
47
  
This would include setting various timelines, conducting pre-hearing 
conferences intended to identify and assure production of necessary 
documents and appearances of witnesses, and choosing and 
explaining how the proceeding will be conducted (e.g., the extent to 
which, if any, counsel will be directly participating, how objections 
will be handled, etc.).  
Perhaps most significantly, it should also include the ability to 
consider issues beyond those specifically stated by the parties in the 
request for arbitration.  There are two chief reasons for this.  The first 
is to preclude the parties from seeking, within the short-term, 
repeated arbitrations each confined to one or more narrow issues.  
The second is to enable the arbitrators to resolve questions 
reasonably related, in their judgment, to the issue(s) identified by the 
parties.
48
 
Finally, to enable the arbitrators to implement their 
procedures, the panel should be vested with subpoena power.  The 
enabling legislation should also provide for an expedited appeal 
process to resolve challenges to any subpoenas. 
 
H. The Arbitrators Should Have an Affirmative Obligation to 
Develop the Record and Should Be Authorized to Undertake Any 
Steps Necessary To Do So 
 
Under our adversarial system, responsibility for development 
and presentation of the record (facts and legal arguments) is the 
responsibility of the parties, specifically the attorneys representing 
the parties.  The attorneys are presumed to know what types of 
evidence the decision maker can and will consider as a matter of law.  
That is the chief reason why having legal representation is so 
important.  If, as is proposed here, a central objective is to reduce this 
reliance upon attorneys, how will the record be developed? 
                                                          
47 Explicit recognition of, and consent to, this authority should be one of 
the items set forth in the signed consent to the arbitration process, as noted in Part 
III.A. 
48 Needless to say, whether, and how, this authority can be reasonably 
proscribed requires further consideration. 
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One approach would be to simply let the parties present 
whatever evidence each believes is important.  Essentially, this is 
what happens when a party appears pro se—and it is strongly 
disfavored by virtually all decision makers.  The more obvious 
reasons: crucial evidence may not be offered, too much irrelevant 
information may be provided, and proceedings are unnecessarily 
lengthened.  
A more efficient approach, the one urged here, is to place 
responsibility for development of the record on the arbitrators, 
themselves.  Essentially, this is what occurs in European civil law 
systems, where the decision makers are expected to assume an active 
role in the process—questioning witnesses and framing or 
reformulating issues, as part of their responsibility.
49
  The arbitrators 
would be expected to assume the controlling role in the process—
framing or reformulating issues, identifying, calling and questioning 
witnesses and requesting documents—as part of their responsibility.  
Although the parties and counsel, if present, could be permitted to 
submit questions, interrogation actually would be conducted by the 
members of the panel.  In addition, the arbitrators would have the 
authority—and be expected—to request and secure any additional 
information they believe necessary to reach the correct decision.  
This would include the authority to call expert witnesses and secure 
additional evaluations.
50
 
 
I. The Arbitrators Should Consist of a Three-Person Panel: One 
Expert in the Child’s Primary Disability; One Special Educator with 
Experience in Administering or Providing Educational Programs to 
Children Identified with the Child’s Primary Disability; and One 
Attorney Familiar with the State’s Special Education Laws and 
Dispute Resolution Procedures 
 
Given the expertise required of, and the authority entrusted to, 
the arbitrators, it should be obvious that it is absolutely crucial that 
                                                          
49 It has been suggested that the main difference between continental and 
American litigators is that the former are mostly “law adversaries” while the latter 
are “law-and-fact adversaries.”  
50 This should clarify an apparently widespread existing reluctance for 
impartial hearing officers to request evaluations on their own motion, despite 
express authority to do so under existing IDEA regulations, § 300.502(d). 
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they be completely independent of both parties, focused solely on the 
needs of the child, and highly knowledgeable (or have access to such 
independent knowledge) about special education.  It should be fairly 
easy to assure impartiality of the arbitrators by either creating or 
adapting one or more existing codes of ethics used by the judiciary, 
the bar, or other professional organizations.
51
  More difficult are 
questions concerning the number and background of the decision 
makers and their method of selection. 
Resolution of these questions usually turns on consideration 
and balancing of two factors: the parties’ confidence in the integrity 
of the decision makers and the parties’ respect for their knowledge 
and expertise.  Both are important in encouraging the parties to 
utilize the process, but there does not appear to be any objective 
criteria or clinical data clearly pointing to the significance of one 
over the other.  It could be argued that integrity of the mediators 
weighs more heavily in mediations, where confidence in the person is 
especially important to success.  While, obviously, a mediator’s 
substantive knowledge concerning the dispute is important, it is not 
unfair to observe, broadly speaking, that the mediator’s primary 
objective is to assist the parties in reaching a mutually acceptable 
agreement, and not find “the right answer.”  In these situations, it 
makes a great deal of sense to follow the commonly-urged procedure 
whereby each party selects one person who, between themselves, 
select a third person, either as a third party or as a single party 
mediator. 
While similar analysis and conclusions could be applicable to 
due process hearings, there are important differences.  For one thing, 
the objective of a due process hearing is not to find a resolution 
mutually acceptable to the parties, but to specify a resolution, which 
may not be acceptable to either party, in whole or in part.  Moreover, 
it could be argued that the substantive objective of the hearing is to 
find “the right answer”: the “right answer” as a matter of law.  And it 
is important to remember that the right answer “as a matter of law” 
may be very different from the right answer as a “matter of fact.” 
                                                          
51 For example, the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes 
(usually referred to as the AAA/ABA Code of Ethics) was substantially revised 
effective March 1, 2004 to make the Code of Ethics virtually identical to the Code 
of Judicial Conduct. 
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Within this framework, arbitration is even more different 
from mediation than is a due process hearing.  There is a similarity in 
that both a due process hearing and arbitration reach a resolution that 
may not be fully coincident with either of the parties.  But the 
important, perhaps more critical, difference is that the arbitration can 
reach for the “right answer as a matter of law and fact.”
52
  This may 
prove to be especially important when it is the interest of a third 
party, the student, that is being considered. 
These factors emphasize the importance of expertise by the 
decision makers.  For these reasons, it is recommended that the 
arbitration decision be reached by a three member panel consisting of 
(1) a person with expertise in the child’s primary disability; (2) a 
special educator with experience in administering or providing 
educational programs to children identified with the child’s primary 
disability; and (3) an attorney familiar with the state’s special 
education laws and dispute resolution procedures.  The specific 
reasons for requiring persons with each of these types of expertise 
should be obvious; but, as a general matter, it is important to 
remember that fairly technical and sophisticated problems may be 
involved, and as experience has shown, all of these types of expertise 
are rarely found in one person.
53
 
Given the nature of the process, it seems logical to place 
responsibility for management of the arbitration proceeding in the 
attorney-member as primus inter pares, whose chief responsibilities 
would be to assure that relevant and sufficient evidence is gathered
54
 
to support a decision and that the decision includes specific direction 
for implementation.  Beyond that, the panel members would have 
equal authority and weight in the conduct of the proceeding, the 
issues in dispute, the types of information to be gathered for the 
record, the witnesses to be called, and so forth.  These types of 
decision, including the final decision(s), would be determined by a 
strict majority vote. 
                                                          
52 Is it too much to suggest that being able to find a resolution of a dispute 
through determination of the “right answer as a matter of law and fact” is most 
likely to resonate as true justice? 
53 In addition, most issues that arise in hearings demand expertise 
concerning disability and education, not law. 
54 For example, this would include the issuance of any necessary 
subpoenas. 
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IV.  RELATED ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED 
 
There are, of course, a number of questions that need to be 
addressed and resolved prior to offering arbitration as an additional 
dispute resolution procedure.  Perhaps the most obvious is how the 
model would be implemented, and specifically, who would be 
responsible for its administration and monitoring.  This question is 
particularly important because it inevitably includes the issue of how 
the system is paid for.
55
   
Probably the most obvious locus for administration is the 
state education agency, which already has final responsibility for 
overseeing other special education dispute resolution processes.  This 
would also comport with the earlier suggestion that enforcement of 
arbitration decisions be undertaken by direct filing with the SEA.  
But, given the expansive authority of the arbitrators, perceptions of 
impartiality are even more important concerning arbitration than they 
are concerning mediation or due process hearings.
  
IDEA has always 
required that hearings be conducted by impartial hearing officers,
56
 
but the early record of implementation of this requirement was 
spotty, at best, and it is not an exaggeration to note that a significant 
number of parents, not to mention their attorneys, believe that many 
due process hearing officers are partial to schools.
57
 
For these reasons, other possibilities should be considered, 
such as bar associations, non-profit advocacy organizations, and law 
schools (possibly in cooperation with schools of education).  Another 
approach might be to adapt the example of other types of arbitration
58
 
by establishing a specialized, independent, non-profit organization 
whose sole focus would be administration of special education 
                                                          
55 This is usually the first question I am asked in presentations, i.e., 
Showcasing Exemplary Practices: CADRE’s 5th National Symposium on Dispute 
Resolution in Special Education, Eugene, OR (Oct. 26, 2011). 
56 34 C.F.R. § 300.511(c) (2012) (Impartial due process hearing). 
57 Consideration of possibilities other than the SEA may be particularly 
important in states where the SEA is not viewed favorably by parents.  This may 
also be desirable to determine whether and how non-SEA management results in 
different management, results, and implementation. 
58 Cf., for example, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), 
which deals with customer/broker-dealer disputes. 
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arbitration on a national basis.
59
  This approach has advantages 
beyond enhancing impartiality and independence.  For one thing, it 
enables development of the law on a national, rather than a state-by-
state, basis, something that has unnecessarily complicated 
interpretation and implementation of IDEA, which is, after all, a 
federal statute.  From a practical viewpoint, it enables the allocation 
and assignment of decision makers (arbitrators) on an “as needed” 
national basis, rather than requiring each state to maintain a 
minimum corps of hearing officers, many of whom may seldom hear 
cases.
60
  
Closely related are issues concerning the quality and training 
of the arbitrators.  This also bears careful consideration given the 
history regarding special education hearing officers.  It is nothing less 
than startling to acknowledge that it took more than twenty-five years 
following adoption of IDEA to define the existing minimum 
standards for hearing officers.
61
  And it is not difficult to argue that, 
at least from a national perspective, adoption of these standards has 
resulted in a uniform increase in proficiency.
62
  Every effort should 
                                                          
59 This might encompass the entire process, including, for example, 
drafting the basic informed consent document as I described in Part III.A. 
60 Perhaps a better analogy would be insurance, where a larger risk pool 
reduces the per person cost. 
61 34 C.F.R. § 300.511 (2012).  
 
(c) Impartial hearing officer. (1) At a minimum, a hearing officer 
. . . (ii) Must possess knowledge of, and the ability to 
understand, the provisions of the Act, Federal and State 
regulations pertaining to the Act, and legal interpretations of the 
Act by Federal and State courts; (iii) Must possess the 
knowledge and ability to conduct hearings in accordance with 
appropriate standard legal practice; and (iv) Must possess the 
knowledge and ability to render and write decisions in 
accordance with appropriate, standard legal practice. 
 
Id. 
62 There are many reasons for this, most flowing from what, in this 
author’s view, are two critical defects: the first is the lack of specificity in the 
standards, themselves; the second is OSEP’s chronic “hands off” attitude toward 
monitoring their implementation.  It is not be surprising, therefore, to find a wide 
variation in the type and quality of hearing officer training among the states, an 
indefensible result given the fact that IDEA is a federal statute. 
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be made to avoid repetition of this history in creating an arbitration 
system, particularly as the arbitration orders will be far more “final.” 
The additional expense of funding another dispute resolution 
system is somewhat more problematic, though ultimately it should 
not be that difficult or controversial.  A strong argument can be made 
that the overall costs of arbitration will be much lower than other 
dispute resolution procedures and that the availability of an 
arbitration alternative will reduce the aggregate costs of dispute 
resolution in special education.  Certainly the costs of an arbitration 
proceeding as outlined above should be less than any comparable due 
process hearing; to these savings must be added the elimination of 
costs that would be incurred from appeal of the mediation agreement 
of the hearing decision.  Under this arrangement, the independent, 
non-profit organization could simply bill the state for the cost of any 
arbitration arising within that state.  Such an approach may be more 
attractive than might first be evident because it relieves the state of 
the continuing administrative overhead that would be required if 
arbitration, like due process, were provided on a state-by-state 
basis.
63
 
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: TEST THE PROCESS 
 
This proposal contemplates a major addition to the existing 
dispute resolution procedures.  However, given the current and long-
standing dissatisfaction with both the tenor and quality of the existing 
due process hearing system, such an effort is justified.64  If it is 
successful, it would reduce inequality in access to legal resources, 
increase confidence by parents and education agencies in the 
integrity of the system, reduce direct and indirect costs, focus dispute 
                                                          
63 The organization would also be responsible for maintaining a roster of 
persons qualified to be arbitrators, training them as necessary, and selecting them 
essentially on a random basis. 
64 It would be understandable, but mistaken, to conclude from this article 
that “due process” has been a failure.  To the contrary, the availability of a due 
process hearing, and subsequent civil litigation, is and continues to be a necessary 
remedy.  But thirty-five years of experience have demonstrated that “due process” 
suffers many of the problems inherent in our adversarial system—especially its 
complexity, cost, and delay.  The system of arbitration proposed in this article is 
intended to provide an additional dispute resolution process that avoids most of 
these problems. 
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resolution on educational outcome, and minimize disparity in 
interpretation and application of the law.  These are objectives worth 
such an effort.
65
 
Such a substantial change should be tested and tuned before 
being authorized and adopted on a national basis.  Accordingly, it is 
strongly urged that the United States Department of Education 
establish a pilot project to test its feasibility.  For example, a modest 
grant administered through a law school, perhaps in cooperation with 
a school of education, could recruit a number of states to develop and 
test variations on a voluntary basis.  The number of states should be 
sufficient to reflect many of the variations in results that might be 
expected because of population size, historical number of due process 
hearings, structure of due process hearing system, and other possible 
relevant factors.  The trial project should also include variations in 
the minimum qualifications and experience of the arbitrators.
66
  Data 
should be compiled for no less than three years; and analysis of 
results, including legislative recommendations, should be submitted 
to the Assistant Secretary and available for public examination. 
                                                          
65 To be fair, it should be noted that, while existing data appears minimal, 
previous arbitration efforts have not been successful.  Minnesota apparently briefly 
tried a tentative arbitration program, under which an arbitrator was selected from a 
state list (unknown who selected the arbitrator), and a binding decision was to be 
issued within twenty days.  Apparently, no arbitration was ever conducted.  Iowa 
was reported to have tried a “hybrid” arbitration system, but no data has been 
located.  
66 It might also be worthwhile to test whether the variability in results that 
inevitably occurs from the existence of fifty different sources of arbitrators could 
be substantially reduced by having a centralized, uniform source of arbitration 
personnel.  For example, as part of the pilot program, a corps of arbitration 
personnel could be recruited, trained, and made available to some of the 
participating states, particularly those with a record of few due process hearings. 
